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ABSTRACT: For nearly 40 years, since the Supreme Court decision in
Illinois Brick, federal antitrust law has prevented indirect purchasers
from complaining of overcharges caused by antitrust violations. The
Court reasoned that direct purchasers are the best and most motivated
antitrust plaintiffs. But in its 2013 Italian Colors decision, the Court
made it extremely difficult for direct purchasers to bring an antitrust
claim in federal court. In doing so, it undermined the policy rationale for
Illinois Brick, paving the way for courts to reconsider the ban on
antitrust enforcement by indirect purchasers.
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INTRODUCTION

The proper role of private enforcement in antitrust law has long been debated.
One of the most significant judicial reforms of antitrust law associated with the
Chicago School was the Supreme Court’s decision to limit standing to direct
purchasers in Illinois Brick Company v. State of Illinois.2 Although that decision
has proven controversial, the Illinois Brick doctrine has endured as a principle of
federal antitrust law for nearly 40 years.
Whatever the merits of the Illinois Brick decision in 1977, subsequent
developments have undermined its rationale. In particular, the Supreme Court’s
2013 decision in American Express v. Italian Colors3 undercuts the fundamental
premises of the Illinois Brick doctrine. The Illinois Brick majority assumed that
direct purchasers were the most motivated and the best situated to enforce antitrust
laws that resulted in supracompetitive prices. But Italian Colors makes it very
difficult for direct purchasers to enforce antitrust laws in a wide variety of
circumstances, because the decision allows potential antitrust defendants to use
arbitration clauses in standard-form contracts to ban antitrust class actions and
require individual arbitration of antitrust disputes. The result is to deprive
overcharged direct purchasers of the tools antitrust law offers for effective
enforcement—class action status, a lengthy statute of limitations, treble damages,
and, if successful, attorneys’ fees.4 Without effective opportunities for enforcement
by direct purchasers, the rationale for excluding indirect purchasers from bringing
antitrust claims collapses.
Antitrust law is common law and is often based on policy arguments. The
decision in Illinois Brick is no exception. The Court based its reasoning on its
assessment of the ability of direct purchasers to enforce antitrust laws effectively.
After Italian Colors, that is no longer the case. Old doctrines must give way in
light of legal developments (including later judicial opinions) that change the
underlying environments and undermine the original policy arguments upon which
the old common law is based. By eliminating most antitrust enforcement by direct
purchasers, Italian Colors has paved the way for reconsideration of Illinois Brick.5

2.
Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 737 (1977). .
3.
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). .
4.
15 U.S.C. § 15a (2013).
5.
It is possible that the Court didn’t actually mean what it said, and that it just wanted to reduce
or eliminate private enforcement altogether, as some have suggested doing. See, e.g., William Breit &
Kenneth G. Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy Case for Treble
Damages, 17 J.L. & Econ. 329 (1974). If you do not think there is a role for private enforcement, you
might view Italian Colors as a further step towards its elimination and therefore a good thing, no matter
how disingenuous. We start from the premise that at least some private antitrust enforcement is
desirable.
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II. ILLINOIS BRICK: ITS HOLDING AND RATIONALE
Courts have long been suspicious of competitors as antitrust plaintiffs, 6 in part
because competitor interests do not necessarily align well with consumer interests.
For example, competitors might object to conduct that benefits consumers, such as
aggressive price competition.7 Beginning in the 1970s, courts began creating limits
on competitor standing in an effort to tackle that disconnect. 8
Consumers, by contrast, are, in some sense, the perfect antitrust plaintiffs.
They are the intended beneficiaries of the competitive markets that antitrust policy
seeks to encourage; consumers are injured by cartels and other anticompetitive
conduct, but benefit from aggressive competition on the merits. Accordingly,
courts have long permitted purchasers to sue to recover overcharges that result
from cartels,9 though some courts have (incorrectly) questioned customers’
standing to enforce the antitrust laws. 10
In Illinois Brick, the plaintiffs were state and local governments who sought
recovery for overcharges that resulted from a cartel that fixed the prices of concrete
blocks. But the governments did not buy the blocks directly from the defendants.
Rather, construction contractors bought the blocks and used them to build
buildings, which the governments later bought. 11 The governments were indirect
purchasers; their injury came from the fact that the contractors, who paid an
artificially high price, passed that higher price on to them. 12
The Supreme Court held that indirect purchasers could not recover the
overcharges that direct purchasers passed on to them.13 Illinois Brick was decided
on two basic policy considerations. First, the Court concluded that because
antitrust law permits direct purchasers to recover the entirety of the overcharge
they faced, without having to deduct price increases they passed on to their own
customers,14 allowing indirect purchasers to also sue for the same antitrust

6.
See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (noting that the
antitrust laws were passed for “the protection of competition, not competitors”).
7.
See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
8.
See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110–13 (1986); Associated
Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 529–33, 538–46
(1983); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473–78 (1982); Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at
489. .
9.
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 487–88 (1968).
10.
See, e.g., Ritz Camera & Image, L.L.C. v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503, 508 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(reaffirming the ability of direct purchasers to bring antitrust cases over claims that they lacked
standing); In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 688 (2d Cir. 2009) (same). See
generally Christopher R. Leslie, The Role of Consumers in Walker Process Litigation, 13 SW. J.L. &
TRADE AMS. 281 (2007).
11.
Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 726–29 (1977).
12.
Id. at 727.
13.
Id. at 728–29, 736.
14.
The Supreme Court rejected the so-called pass-on defense in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
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violation would create a double recovery. 15 The Court considered reversing the
rule allowing direct purchasers to recover the entire overcharge without deduction,
but rejected that argument because of its second conclusion: that direct purchasers
were the best positioned to enforce antitrust law. 16 The Court interpreted its prior
decision to reject a passing-on defense to antitrust claims to support the proposition
“that the antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by concentrating the full
recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers rather than by allowing every
plaintiff potentially affected by the overcharge to sue only for the amount it could
show was absorbed by it.”17 Further, the majority concluded that denying standing
to indirect purchasers was more consistent with “the legislative purpose in creating
a group of ‘private attorneys general’ to enforce the antitrust laws” because direct
purchasers could sue for “the full extent of the overcharge paid by them [without
having] to apportion the overcharge among all that may have absorbed a part of
it.”18 The Court also felt that direct purchase overcharges were easier to measure
than pass-throughs, particularly if courts had to allocate the injury between the
direct and indirect purchasers. 19
The dissent worried that indirect purchasers would be short-changed.20 The
majority responded that allowing direct purchasers to recover the entirety of the
overcharge would not only be simpler to calculate, but would also promote more
vigorous antitrust enforcement by centralizing the incentive to sue in one party
who could recover all the losses.21 In short, Illinois Brick reflected an economic
conclusion that one, but only one, overcharged purchaser in the downstream chain
should be entitled to sue, and that for various reasons the simplest and most
effective solution was for the direct purchaser to be that one purchaser–plaintiff.22
The Illinois Brick ruling proved controversial. Some commentators decried
it;23 others defended it.24 The leading antitrust treatise expresses doubt about the
wisdom of the doctrine:
15.
Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 730.
16.
Id. at 745–47.
17.
Id. at 735.
18.
Id. at 746.
19.
Id. at 741–43.
20.
Id. at 748 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
21.
Id. at 745–46.
22.
Exceptions exist, such as cost-plus contracts. See id. at 736 (“In [a cost-plus contract]
situation, the [direct] purchaser is insulated from any decrease in its sales as a result of attempting to
pass on the overcharge, because its customer is committed to buying a fixed quantity regardless of
price.”). See also Donald I. Baker, Revisiting History—What Have We Learned About Private Antitrust
Enforcement That We Would Recommend to Others?, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 379, 391 (2004)
(“Indirect purchasers should have standing to sue, but under procedural rules that encourage or even
mandate consolidation of their claims with those of direct purchasers.” (citing Donald I. Baker,
Federalism and Futility: Hitting the Potholes on the Illinois Brick Road, ANTITRUST MAG., Fall 2002,
at 14 [hereinafter Baker, Federalism and Futility])). But see Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S.
199, 217–18 (1990) (rejecting application of cost-plus exception).
23.
See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, Illinois Brick: A Look Back and a Look Ahead, 17 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 18 (2004); Andrew I. Gavil, Thinking Outside the Illinois Brick Box: A Proposal
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The obvious difficulty with denying damages for consumers buying
from an intermediary is that they are injured, often more than the
intermediary, who may also be injured but for whom recovery of the
entire overcharge is typically a windfall. Thus the indirect purchaser rule
greatly overcompensates intermediaries and greatly undercompensate[s]
consumers in the name of efficiency in the administration of the antitrust
laws.
....
[Section 4] of the Clayton Act awards damages to the person who is
“injured,” and Illinois Brick frequently gives the award to the wrong
person.25
Thirty-five states have rejected the doctrine, permitting antitrust enforcement by
indirect purchasers under their state antitrust laws. 26 As a result, judges and
scholars have developed a sophisticated body of law and economic thought on the
problem of computing downstream overcharges, though that law has developed
primarily in state, rather than federal, antitrust cases. 27
Furthermore, in the years that followed, the Court put substantial constraints
on the ability of competitors to bring private antitrust suits. For example, the Court

for Reform, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 171 (2009); J. Thomas Prud’homme, Jr. & Ellen S. Cooper, One
More Challenge for the AMC: Repairing the Legacy of Illinois Brick, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 675, 683–84
(2006); cf. Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in Modern
Antitrust Standing Analysis, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (arguing that Illinois Brick should be
retained but limited).
24.
See, e.g., Barak D. Richman & Christopher R. Murray, Rebuilding Illinois Brick: A
Functionalist Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 69, 84 (2007); Gregory J.
Werden & Marius Schwartz, Illinois Brick and the Deterrence of Antitrust Violations—An Economic
Analysis, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 629, 637–38 (1984).
25.
2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ROGER D. BLAIR & CHRISTINE PIETTE
DURRANCE, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶
346k at 189, 197 (3d ed. 2007); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE:
PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 74–76 (2005) (criticizing Illinois Brick); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Commentary, The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1717, 1717 (1990).
26.
See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 269 (2007)
[hereinafter
AMC
REPORT], available
at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_
recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf. For a summary of approaches taken by states that have repealed
Illinois Brick, see Gale Price, One Short of a Load: Why an Illinois Brick Repealer Will Increase Private
Antitrust Enforcement in Montana, 74 MONT. L. REV. 399, 406–09 (2013). The Supreme Court held in
California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989), that those state laws were not preempted by the
federal rule in Illinois Brick. For a discussion of states to repeal Illinois Brick, see, for example,
Baker, Federalism and Futility, supra note 21, at 17–18; Ronald W. Davis, Indirect Purchaser Litigation:
ARC America’s Chickens Come Home to Roost on the Illinois Brick Wall, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 391–93
(1997); Matthew M. Duffy, Chipping Away at the Illinois Brick Wall: Expanding Exceptions to the
Indirect Purchaser Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1709, 1710 (2012); William H. Page, The Limits of
State Indirect Purchaser Suits: Class Certification in the Shadow of Illinois Brick, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 1–
6 (1999).
27.
AREEDA ET AL., supra note 24, at ¶ 396 (discussing the computation of overcharges in
indirect purchaser cases, and rejecting the claim that it is too difficult).
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developed a new doctrine, “antitrust injury,” which created higher standing hurdles
in antitrust than in other private law doctrines. 28 Government enforcement has also
declined substantially during the period since Illinois Brick.29 Barriers to
competitor standing increase the importance of purchaser standing to bring
antitrust claims.30
As a result of the Illinois Brick decision and the Court’s antitrust injury cases,
for nearly 40 years, enforcement of the Sherman Act has been the province of
government agencies, some competitors, and purchasers—but only the first, direct
purchaser. While direct purchasers are sometimes consumers, they are often
corporate intermediaries. For example, the direct purchasers of Microsoft
Windows are usually computer manufacturers, not the people who actually use the
software.31 Similarly, the direct purchasers of pharmaceuticals are drugstores, not
patients.32 As a result, in many cases, antitrust relies on corporate proxies to
represent consumer interests.
Reliance on corporate proxies had the potential to work, at least at first. An
early empirical study suggested that the central premise of the Court’s logic—that
direct purchasers would be well motivated to sue—was borne out in fact.33 But
subsequent changes in antitrust doctrine and practice require reevaluation of the
premise that direct purchasers can, and will, litigate antitrust claims, and that they
can do so better than indirect purchasers.
III. ANTITRUST ARBITRATION AT THE DAWN OF ILLINOIS BRICK
Illinois Brick is a product of its time. The majority based its opinion on
several assumptions and policy judgments that, even if true in 1977, were not
static. Most significantly for our purposes, the Court penned Illinois Brick at a time

28.
See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110 (1986); Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983); Blue Shield of
Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476–77 (1982); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429
U.S. 477, 489 (1977). But see Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377,
1387–88 (2014) (rejecting the antitrust standing test as too restrictive for false advertising cases).
29.
See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, The Decline of Antitrust Enforcement, 19 Rev. Indus. Org. 49, 49
(2001).
30.
Although awarding antitrust damages to competitors does not compensate consumer victims
of antitrust violations, competitor-initiated antitrust litigation can reduce the expected profitability of
antitrust violations and, thus, increase deterrence, which ultimately benefits consumers.
31.
In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 710 (D. Md. 2001),
supplemented, No. MDL-1332, 2001 WL 137254 (D. Md. Feb. 15, 2001), aff’d sub nom. Kloth v.
Microsoft Corp., 444 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Plaintiffs’ supra-competitive price claims arise, very
simply, from the assertion that Microsoft obtained monopoly profits from its sales to OEMs, who
passed on these illegal overcharges to plaintiffs. This is the Illinois Brick paradigm, and plaintiffs’
claims for supra-competitive prices are barred.”); see also Mark v. Microsoft Corp. (In re Microsoft
Corp. Antitrust Litig.), 401 F. Supp. 2d 461, 463 (D. Md. 2005) (following Illinois Brick in decision to
bar indirect purchasers from bringing state claims against Microsoft).
32.
See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 606–07 (7th Cir.
1997).
33.
See Werden & Schwartz, supra note 23, at 667.
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when pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate antitrust claims were not enforceable.
The legal landscape regarding antitrust arbitration has changed considerably in the
intervening years.
The federal government’s validation of private arbitration began in 1925
when Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).34 Section 2 of the
FAA provides that if a commercial contract contains an agreement to settle
controversies that arise from the contract through private arbitration, the promise to
arbitrate “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 35 The FAA instructed
federal courts to enforce agreements between firms to settle their commercial
disputes through binding arbitration instead of going to court.
Although Congress passed the FAA in 1925,36 federal courts did not
meaningfully address the issue of the arbitrability of antitrust claims until the
1960s. In 1968, the Second Circuit in American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P.
Maguire & Co. became the first court of appeals to hold that antitrust claims were
not subject to arbitration.37 The Second Circuit articulated four rationales for
concluding that the FAA did not apply to antitrust claims:
(1) deference to private arbitration agreements could lessen the
plaintiffs’ incentive to pursue antitrust actions, weakening the use of
“private attorneys general” as a foundation of Sherman Act enforcement;
(2) arbitration clauses often result from adhesion contracts, and Congress
intended that these matters be heard in the courts; (3) arbitrators may be
incompetent to comprehend complex antitrust issues; and (4) arbitrators
may be biased business people unable to reach fair outcomes. 38
The American Safety rationale proved persuasive across the circuits, as courts
relied on American Safety to hold that antitrust claims were not subject to

34.
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–200 (2013); Bellevue Drug Co. v. Caremarks PCS (In re Pharmacy Benefit
Managers Antitrust Litig.), 700 F.3d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 to
counteract ‘the traditional judicial hostility to the enforcement of arbitration agreements.’” (quoting
Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2003))).
35.
9 U.S.C. § 2.
36.
John R. Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced
Accommodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C. L. REV. 219, 227 (1986).
37.
Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., Inc., 391 F.2d 821, 827–28 (2d Cir. 1968);
Donald I. Baker & Mark R. Stabile, Arbitration of Antitrust Claims: Opportunities and Hazards for
Corporate Counsel, 48 BUS. LAW 395, 402 (1993).
38.
Steven R. Swanson, Antisuit Injunctions in Support of International Arbitration, 81 TUL. L.
REV. 395, 409 (2006); see also Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1441–42 (9th Cir. 1994) (“In
American Safety, the Second Circuit held that antitrust claims cannot be arbitrated because of the public
interest in enforcing antitrust laws, the potential bias and limited expertise of arbitrators, the complexity
of antitrust law, and the procedural differences between trials and arbitrations.” (citing Am. Safety
Equip. Corp., 391 F.2d at 826–27)); Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack?: Exploring the
Recent Judicial Skepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled
Legal Landscape, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 518 (2009) (reciting the four rationales in
another fashion).
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arbitration.39 In fact, every court of appeals that considered the issue uniformly
followed American Safety and held that antitrust claims were inappropriate for
arbitration.40
By 1977, the year that Illinois Brick was decided, the Supreme Court had
neither addressed the issue of antitrust arbitration nor questioned the validity of
American Safety and its progeny. Until the mid-1980s, the American Safety rule
prohibiting arbitration of antitrust claims was well established, widespread, and not
particularly controversial. Thus, at the time of the Illinois Brick decision, antitrust
arbitration was not a possibility. Private antitrust claims were litigated, not shunted
off to private arbitration panels pursuant to pre-agreed-upon arbitration clauses.
The Illinois Brick Court assumed that direct purchasers had an unhampered ability
to bring antitrust claims in federal court. That assumption would not survive the
following decade.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF ANTITRUST ARBITRATION IN THE POST-ILLINOIS BRICK
ERA
The American Safety doctrine began to erode in the 1980s, as the Supreme
Court interpreted the FAA as creating a heavy presumption in favor of arbitration
for all claims.41 The Supreme Court began to dislodge the American Safety
doctrine when it considered whether Sherman Act claims could be decided by
international arbitration tribunals in other countries. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler–Plymouth Inc., the Supreme Court considered whether the
American Safety rule should apply to the international arbitration of antitrust
claims.42
The Court began by noting that it was primarily concerned with whether an
American court should allow private parties to an international transaction—
pursuant to an arbitration clause in their commercial contract—to submit an

39.
See, e.g., Lake Commc’ns, Inc. v. ICC Corp., 738 F.2d 1473, 1479 (9th Cir. 1984); Lee v.
Ply*Gem Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 1266, 1274–75 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Applied Digital Tech., Inc. v. Cont’l
Cas. Co., 576 F.2d 116, 117–19 (7th Cir. 1978); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1974)
(“[A]ntitrust claims are not appropriate subjects of arbitration.”); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co.,
Inc., 453 F.2d 1209, 1215–16 (2d Cir. 1972); Helfenbein v. Int’l Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1068, 1070–71
(8th Cir. 1971); Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air Preheater Co., 426 F.2d 980, 983–84 (9th Cir. 1970);
A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 715–16 (9th Cir. 1968); In re Aimcee
Wholesale Corp., 237 N.E.2d 223, 224–27 (N.Y. 1968).
40.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 620–21 (1985).
41.
See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
(“[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration.”); id. at 24–25 (noting that “[t]he Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law,
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether
the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay,
or a like defense to arbitrability”).
42.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 632–35.
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antitrust dispute to an international tribunal instead of a federal district court. 43
When analyzing the arbitrability of the antitrust claims at issue, the Mitsubishi
Court emphasized the international context of the dispute, noting that
[C]oncerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign
and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the
international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of
disputes require that we enforce the parties’ agreement, even assuming
that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context. 44
In reaching its result, the Court critiqued each rationale that the Second
Circuit used to render antitrust claims non-arbitrable in American Safety.45 The
Supreme Court also rejected any “presumption against arbitration of statutory
claims.”46 The Court, however, did not explicitly overrule the American Safety
rule. Instead, it distinguished American Safety as not involving international
transactions and found “it unnecessary to assess the legitimacy of the American
Safety doctrine as applied to agreements to arbitrate arising from domestic
transactions.”47
Although the Mitsubishi Court explicitly declined to reverse American Safety
and to apply its opinion to domestic antitrust claims, some lower courts
nevertheless interpreted Mitsubishi as making all antitrust claims arbitrable.48 For

43.
Id. at 624 (“We granted certiorari primarily to consider whether an American court should
enforce an agreement to resolve antitrust claims by arbitration when that agreement arises from an
international transaction.”).
44.
Id. at 629.
45.
The Mitsubishi Court noted:
At the outset, we confess to some skepticism of certain aspects of the American Safety
doctrine. . . . The mere appearance of an antitrust dispute does not alone warrant
invalidation of the selected forum on the undemonstrated assumption that the arbitration
clause is tainted. . . . Next, potential complexity should not suffice to ward off
arbitration. . . . [W]e also reject the proposition that an arbitration panel will pose too
great a danger of innate hostility to the constraints on business conduct that antitrust law
imposes. . . . We are left, then, with the core of the American Safety doctrine—the
fundamental importance to American democratic capitalism of the regime of the antitrust
laws. . . . The importance of the private damages remedy, however, does not compel the
conclusion that it may not be sought outside an American court.
Id. at 632–36.
46.
Id. at 625.
47.
Id. at 629.
48.
In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Although the Supreme
Court has yet to directly consider the arbitrability of domestic antitrust claims, the Court’s analysis of
the question in Mitsubishi is equally applicable to domestic antitrust claims . . . . We therefore have no
difficulty concluding that domestic antitrust claims, as a class, are suitable for arbitration.”); DJ Mfg.
Corp. v. Tex-Shield, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 140, 145 (D.P.R. 1998) (“Even though the Court did not address
the issue of arbitrability of antitrust issues in the domestic arena, it seriously undermined the rationale
espoused by the Second Circuit in American Safety regarding the propriety of arbitration of antitrust
issues in general.”); see also Baker & Stabile, supra note 36, at 406 (“Although the Court’s holding in
Mitsubishi is limited to the international arena, its logic is not.”).
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example, the Ninth Circuit treated the Mitsubishi “Court’s meticulous step-by-step
disembowelment of the American Safety doctrine” as “effectively overrul[ing]
American Safety and its progeny.”49 Other circuits followed suit and began to
revisit their rules against allowing domestic antitrust claims to be arbitrated,
ultimately holding that, despite the fact that Mitsubishi involved international
arbitration, the opinion required that domestic antitrust lawsuits be subject to
arbitration.50
The combination of Congress making arbitration clauses enforceable and
federal courts holding that antitrust claims were arbitrable led many potential
antitrust defendants to engage in a two-pronged strategy to minimize or avoid
antitrust liability. First, many businesses imposed arbitration agreements on their
distributors and customers.51 Second, they structured their arbitration clauses to

49.
Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994).
50.
See, e.g., Seacoast Motors of Salisbury, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 6,
11 (1st Cir. 2001) (expressly rejecting American Safety in view of Mitsubishi); Kotam Elecs., Inc. v.
JBL Consumer Prods., Inc., 93 F.3d 724, 728 (11th Cir. 1996) (“In light of Mitsubishi and its
progeny . . . we hold that . . . arbitration agreements concerning domestic antitrust claims are
enforceable.”); see also HCI Techs., Inc. v. Avaya, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 518, 524 (E.D. Va. 2006) (“A
review of subsequent case law reveals that while the grim reaper may not yet have found American
Safety’s address, he is certainly in the neighborhood.”); Tex-Shield, Inc., 998 F. Supp. at 145 (“[W]e
also hold that domestic antitrust disputes . . . are arbitrable.”); Hunt v. Up N. Plastics, Inc., 980 F. Supp.
1046, 1049–50 (D. Minn. 1997) (finding the same); Acquaire v. Can. Dry Bottling, 906 F. Supp. 819,
837 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding the same); Syscomm Int’l Corp. v. Synoptics Commc’ns, Inc., 856 F.
Supp. 135, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (“While American Safety has not been explicitly overruled, this Court
believes that . . . domestic antitrust claims are arbitrable.”); Hough v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 283, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“[T]he reasoning of Mitsubishi should apply with
equal force to domestic claims.”), aff’d, 946 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1991); W. Int’l Media Corp. v. Johnson,
754 F. Supp. 871, 873–74 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (“Although the Court supported its rejection of some of
these concerns on grounds tied to the principles involved in international commercial transactions, the
Court’s reliance on arbitration principles and the legislative histories of antitrust provisions suggests
that the result arrived at in Mitsubishi would be forthcoming in the domestic situation.”).
51.
See Homa v. Am. Express Co., 494 F. App’x 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2012) (“In the years since
Congress adopted the FAA, clauses containing class-arbitration waivers have become ubiquitous in
contracts involving products and services distributed or supplied on a mass basis, such as contracts
providing for cell phone service, credit cards, and cable service.”); Jason W. Burge & Lara K. Richards,
A Compelling Case for Streamlining Venue of Actions to Enjoin Arbitration, 88 TUL. L. REV. 773, 774
(2014) (“Arbitration agreements have become ‘ubiquitous in American society.’ If you have signed a
contract for a cell phone, bought stock through a brokerage account, or accepted new employment,
chances are you have signed a contract with an arbitration clause.”); Joshua T. Mandelbaum, Stuck in a
Bind: Can the Arbitration Fairness Act Solve the Problems of Mandatory Binding Arbitration in the
Consumer Context?, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1084 (2009) (“The benefits that accrue to businesses that
utilize mandatory-binding-arbitration clauses in consumer contracts help explain why these clauses
have become so ubiquitous. As of 2002, over 1000 companies included mandatory binding arbitration
in routine sales transactions.”); Alexander A. Reinert, The Burdens of Pleading, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
1767, 1777 (2014) (“As the enforceability and scope of arbitration agreements have increased,
arbitration has become ubiquitous across disparate areas of the law.”); Judith Resnik, Comment,
Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers,
125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 121–22 (2011). But cf. Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky”
Arbitration Clauses?: The Use of Arbitration Clauses After Conception and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV.
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make antitrust claims less lucrative and harder to bring. For example, some
arbitration clauses attempt to preclude antitrust plaintiffs from recovering the treble
damages mandated by federal antitrust law. So far, courts have rejected such
attempts.52 Courts have, however, been more amenable to defendants’ attempts to
use arbitration clauses in order to shorten the Clayton Act’s four-year statute of
limitations53 and to eliminate the antitrust provision that allows a successful
plaintiff to recover attorneys’ fees.54
Most controversially, many arbitration clauses prohibit class action
litigation.55 While these class action waivers have been widely criticized by
scholars, judges, and legislators,56 the Supreme Court has been decidedly less
wary. When, for example, the California Supreme Court condemned class action
waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable, 57 the U.S. Supreme Court, in
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, reversed the California rule.58 The Court
reasoned that the FAA preempted state attempts to invalidate class action waivers
contained in arbitration clauses.59 Although Concepcion involved state-based
consumer law, the decision seemed to endorse class action waivers more broadly. 60
In addition to making it more difficult for antitrust plaintiffs to bring class
action litigation in federal court, the Supreme Court, in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds International Corp., also made it easier for antitrust defendants to
evade class-wide arbitration.61 Because arbitration clauses now routinely prohibit
955 (2014) (finding that companies have been slower to adopt arbitration clauses in franchise contracts
than others have predicted).
52.
Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2006).
53.
In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d at 288–89.
54.
See, e.g., James C. Justice Cos., Inc. v. Deere & Co., No. 5:06-cv-00287, 2008 WL 828923,
at *5 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 27, 2008) (The plaintiff “has offered no evidence that paying its own attorney’s
fees and costs in arbitration would prevent it from effectively vindicating its rights under the Sherman
Act. Therefore, Court cannot conclude that the Dealership Agreement’s limitation on attorney’s fees
and costs is inconsistent with the policies of the Sherman Act.”); cf. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 52–53
(striking the anti-fee provision in an arbitration clause because “the ban on the recovery of attorney’s
fees and costs in the arbitration agreements would burden Plaintiffs here with prohibitive arbitration
costs, preventing Plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights in arbitration”).
55.
See Homa, 494 F. App’x at 197 (“In the years since Congress adopted the FAA, clauses
containing class-arbitration waivers have become ubiquitous in contracts involving products and
services distributed or supplied on a mass basis, such as contracts providing for cell phone service,
credit cards, and cable service.”).
56.
See, e.g., Davis v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 299 F. App’x 662, 664 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he
class action waiver provision is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.”); Myriam Gilles
& Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79
U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 640–52 (2012).
57.
See Discover Bank v. Superior Court of L.A., 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005).
58.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
59.
Id.
60.
Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice,
90 OR. L. REV. 703, 718 (2012) (“In the near future, we can expect that even more companies will
impose arbitral class action waivers as a means to insulate themselves from class actions because
Concepcion has changed the calculus.”).
61.
Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 (2010).
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both class actions and class arbitration, victims of antitrust violations are often
prevented from bringing any collective action. Indeed, some arbitration clauses
prevented antitrust plaintiffs from coordinating in any fashion, including sharing
the costs of developing common factual and economic data. 62
After Concepcion and Stolt–Nielsen, however, antitrust plaintiffs still had
another argument against class-action waivers in arbitration agreements: the
Effective Vindication Doctrine. In making antitrust claims arbitrable, the
Mitsubishi Court concluded that “so long as the prospective litigant effectively
may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will
continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.” 63 This language
embodies the Effective Vindication Doctrine, which provides that “arbitration of
the claim will not be compelled if the prospective litigant cannot effectively
vindicate his statutory rights in the arbitral forum.” 64 The doctrine was designed to
protect the statutory rights of antitrust victims. For example, courts have invoked
the Effective Vindication Doctrine to invalidate the detrebling provisions
embedded in arbitration clauses.65
In 2012, the Second Circuit applied the Effective Vindication Doctrine to
arbitration clauses that forbid class action litigation and classwide arbitration. In In
re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, a group of merchants entered into
contracts with American Express that contained arbitration clauses, which
provided that “[t]here shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated
on a class action basis . . . .”66 Despite signing these class action waivers, the
merchants filed an antitrust class action in federal court. The merchants argued that
because the necessary expert witnesses were so expensive, and because there was
so little money at stake for any one merchant, compelling the merchants to
individually arbitrate would prevent them from effectively vindicating their rights
to an antitrust remedy; a class action represented the only cost-effective form of
adjudication. After the district court granted American Express’ motion to dismiss
based on the arbitration clause, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that “the
plaintiffs have adequately demonstrated that the class action waiver provision at
issue should not be enforced because enforcement of the clause would effectively

62.
See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“[The arbitration agreement’s] confidentiality provision prevents Italian Colors from
informally arranging with other merchants to produce a common expert report. . . . In short, the
agreement as applied in this case cuts off not just class arbitration, but any avenue for sharing, shifting,
or shrinking necessary costs.”).
63.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985).
64.
In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 282–83 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Green Tree
Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)); see also Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2314
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[The Effective Vindication Doctrine provides that a]n arbitration clause will
not be enforced if it prevents the effective vindication of federal statutory rights, however it achieves
that result.”).
65.
Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 37, 47–48 (1st Cir. 2006) (invoking Mitsubishi to
disapprove such waivers).
66.
In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2012).
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preclude any action seeking to vindicate the statutory rights asserted by the
plaintiffs.”67 The Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit decision in light of its
opinion in Concepcion, which held that the FAA preempted California’s rule
against class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts. 68 On remand, the Second
Circuit again held that the Effective Vindication Doctrine precluded mandatory
individual arbitration of the merchants’ claims.
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the Supreme Court
again considered whether the Effective Vindication Doctrine excused the
merchants from the mandatory arbitration clause. 69 Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia applied the doctrine to the facts of Italian Colors. He noted the
merchants’ evidence “from an economist who estimated that the cost of an expert
analysis necessary to prove the antitrust claims would be ‘at least several hundred
thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million,’ while the maximum recovery for
an individual plaintiff would be $12,850, or $38,549 when trebled.” 70 Scalia
asserted that what mattered was the right to pursue an antitrust remedy, not
whether the merchants could exercise that right economically; he proclaimed that
“the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy
does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”71 As
applied, this meant “a contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable under
the Federal Arbitration Act when the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a
federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery.” 72 Consequently, the Court
held that potential defendants can use arbitration clauses to prevent class actions,
even when a class action is the only way to effectively vindicate the right to an
antitrust remedy.73 According to Justice Scalia, “the antitrust laws do not guarantee
an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.” 74
In the aftermath of Italian Colors, potential antitrust defendants have every
incentive to include class action waivers in their mandatory arbitration clauses. 75

67.
In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted,
judgment vacated sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010) (Mem).
68.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). Although Concepcion
seemed to reject the effective vindication doctrine in context of state claims, the case “was decided on
preemption grounds . . . and the Supreme Court had no occasion in that case to decide whether access to
class proceedings was necessary for the effective vindication of a federal statutory right.” Ellen
Meriwether, Class Action Waiver and the Effective Vindication Doctrine at the Antitrust/Arbitration
Crossroads, 26 ANTITRUST 67, 67 (2012); cf. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304,
2319–20 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“AT&T Mobility was not—and could not have been—about the
effective-vindication rule.”).
69.
Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2307.
70.
Id. at 2308 (citation omitted).
71.
Id. at 2311.
72.
See id. at 2307.
73.
Id. at 2311 (discussing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991)).
74.
Id. at 2309.
75.
See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, How Italian Colors Guts Private Antitrust Enforcement By
Replacing It With Ineffective Forms of Arbitration 8 (Working Paper, 2015) (on file with authors)
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And they are increasingly doing so—the number of large companies that include
such waivers has more than doubled since Conception and Italian Colors.76 The
proliferation of arbitration clauses, combined with class action waivers,
fundamentally changes the legal environment from the one that existed during the
mid-1970s when the Court decided Illinois Brick. The Illinois Brick majority
assumed that antitrust claims would be litigated, not arbitrated, and that they could
be litigated as class actions.
V. ITALIAN COLORS UNDERMINES THE RATIONALE OF ILLINOIS BRICK
Illinois Brick was based on two central premises. First, the Court assumed that
direct purchasers were the best private antitrust plaintiffs.77 Unlike competitors,
purchasers have incentives that are generally aligned with the public interest in a
competitive market. And among purchasers, the Court reasoned that direct
purchasers have more concentrated interests than ultimate consumers, so they may
be more likely to sue—and to hire better lawyers when they do. The calculation of
damages is also simpler when only one transaction has occurred than when courts
have to trace the pass-through of the overcharge. 78
Second, the Illinois Brick Court worried about the risk of double
compensation if it permitted indirect purchasers to sue as well as direct purchasers.
In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., a 1968 case, the Court
held that an antitrust defendant could not claim a deduction for a price overcharge
that the direct purchaser passed through to downstream purchasers. 79 Because of
that decision, nine years later in Illinois Brick, the Court worried that allowing both
the direct and the downstream purchaser to sue would result in a double recovery. 80
While antitrust law does not always object to multiple recoveries—the Clayton Act
awards treble damages in order to deter undetected antitrust violations 81—the

(“Given the Italian Colors decision, it is hard to see why all businesses would not at least insert
arbitration clauses into their contracts that preclude class arbitration.”).
76.
See, e.g., Jeremy B. Merrill, One-Third of Top Websites Restrict Customers’ Right to Sue,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/upshot/one-third-of-top-websitesrestrict-customers-right-to-sue.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=1 (noting that one-third of customer-facing
web sites ban class actions by a “browsewrap” contract and that the number of contracts that ban class
actions across all companies has “more than doubled” since the Court made them legal). For instances of
courts applying arbitration to bar class antitrust claims, see, for example, In re Polyurethane Foam
Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 5365448 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2014) (“reluctantly” granting motion to compel
arbitration because of Italian Colors); Paduano v. Express Scripts, 2014 WL 54313210 (E.D.N.Y. Oct.
27, 2014) (granting motion to compel arbitration under an agreement that banned antitrust class
arbitrations).
77.
See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text.
78.
Cf. Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc., 49 Cal. 4th 758 (2010) (refusing to allow defendants to assert a
pass-through defense).
79.
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968).
80.
Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730 (1977).
81.
15 U.S.C. § 15a (2013); see also Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Toward an Empirical
and Theoretical Assessment of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1269 (2013); cf.
Christopher R. Leslie, De Facto Detrebling: The Rush to Settlement in Antitrust Class Action Litigation,
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Court was clearly concerned by the prospect that the defendant would have to pay
damages from the same sale to two or more plaintiffs. 82
Both pillars of the Illinois Brick argument collapse after Italian Colors. As
antitrust arbitration agreements become more common in sales contracts, many
direct purchasers are no longer able to file antitrust suits challenging overcharges.
They can theoretically arbitrate those disputes, but in doing so they will not
necessarily get the advantages antitrust law consciously offers to induce suit: treble
damages and attorneys’ fees.83 In addition, because arbitration proceedings are
almost always confidential,84 the world will not benefit from learning about the
antitrust violation and subsequent plaintiffs will not benefit from collateral
estoppel.85
Further, because the Supreme Court has allowed arbitration agreements to
forbid class actions,86 antitrust enforcement will be particularly ineffective in
circumstances in which the direct purchases involve a large group of small-value
transactions. The named plaintiff in Italian Colors, for instance, had only a small
amount personally at stake. 87 A class of such plaintiffs may well have an incentive
to sue, but individuals certainly will not arbitrate when the expected costs of
arbitration exceed the maximum individual recovery. Even if the individual had the
desire, no rational attorney would take the case.
The use of arbitration clauses to impede class action litigation is particularly
disruptive in the context of antitrust violations, which often impose relatively low
costs on a relatively large group of victims. This is precisely the scenario for which
class actions were designed. Consequently, federal judges have noted that “the
Supreme Court has long recognized that class actions serve a valuable role in the
enforcement of antitrust laws.”88 In particular, retailer class actions—such as the
50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1009, 1009–10 (2008) (explaining how courts interfere with the treble damages
regime).
82.
Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 730–31.
83.
Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 47–48 (1st Cir. 2006), held that restrictions on treble
damages in antitrust arbitration agreements were unenforceable. But it is not clear that that ruling will
survive American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309–11 (2013).
84.
See, e.g., Global Reinsurance Corp.-U.S. Branch v. Argonaut Ins. Co., Nos. 07 Civ.
8196(PKC), 07 Civ. 8350(PKC), 2008 WL 1805459, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2008) (“The federal
policy in favor of arbitration is promoted by permitting one of the principle [sic] advantages of
arbitration—confidentiality—to be achieved.”).
85.
Arbitration normally does not create precedent that binds the participants in subsequent
litigation with non-parties. See, e.g., Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 982 P.2d 229 (Cal. 1999). But some
courts have applied collateral estoppel to antitrust arbitrations. See Global Live Events v. Ja–Tail
Enters., LLC, No. CV 13-8293 SVW, 2014 WL 1830998, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2014).
86.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750–53 (2011) (holding that classes
are not permitted to arbitrate antitrust disputes because class action procedure interferes with the
operation of arbitration). Italian Colors extended that conclusion even to cases when it was clear that it
was infeasible to bring a case except as a class action.
87.
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that at most Italian
Colors could have recovered less than $40,000, far less than it costs to litigate a rule of reason antitrust
case).
88.
In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
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one that Italian Colors put an effective end to—have been historically important.89
Because of the proliferation of arbitration clauses, direct purchasers in a postItalian Colors world are no longer the most obvious plaintiffs. If direct purchasers
are effectively prevented from securing full compensation for the antitrust injuries,
the possibility of damages being passed on to indirect purchasers is eliminated. In
the aftermath of Italian Colors, indirect purchasers may be in a better position to
hold antitrust violators accountable because they are less likely to be bound by an
arbitration clause, which requires consent. 90 Consequently, a class of indirect
purchasers is likely to be a better antitrust plaintiff than an individual direct
purchaser forced to arbitrate her antitrust dispute. This undermines one of the key
assumptions upon which Illinois Brick is based.
Because direct purchasers are less likely to bring claims after Italian Colors,
the Illinois Brick Court’s worry about double compensation is also substantially
reduced. If a direct purchaser is subject to an arbitration agreement and is unlikely
to bring a claim, there is little risk of double compensation. Moreover, excessive
compensation is particularly unlikely in the context of class actions because
successful participants in antitrust class actions generally receive “less than single
damages.”91 Thus, even if direct purchasers and indirect purchasers were to bring
parallel class actions for the same antitrust violation, the losing defendant is likely
to pay out less than the treble damages mandated by antitrust law. Further, the
calculation of injury may be substantially simpler in cases in which the direct
purchaser cannot practically sue and therefore overcharges need not be
apportioned. Consequently, the more serious risk in this new antitrust world is
undercompensation and underdeterrence.

89.
See, e.g., LLOYD CONSTANTINE, PRICELESS: THE CASE THAT BROUGHT DOWN THE
VISA/MASTERCARD BANK CARTEL (2013).
90.
Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 (2010) (“[T]he FAA
imposes certain rules of fundamental importance, including the basic precept that arbitration ‘is a matter
of consent, not coercion.’” (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989))). In a world in which courts seem to enforce anything one party labels as a
contract, whether or not it is signed or even visible to the “agreeing” party, see generally NANCY S.
KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS (2013); Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459 (2006), there is
some risk that even indirect purchasers in some industries like software will be bound to these
arbitration agreements as well. That is a limitation on our proposal. But it will not make it completely
ineffective. And we think the right solution is for courts to impose some reasonable limits on the ability
to compel arbitration through such form contracts, as some courts have done. For an example of an
electronic arbitration clause found unconscionable, see Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165,
1177 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Briceño v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 911 So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005). But see Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113, 117–19 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (enforcing an
arbitration clause included in an online “Terms and Conditions of Sale” hyperlink). One study showed
that courts found arbitration clauses unconscionable at twice the rate they found other provisions
unconscionable. Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of
Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 186 (2004).
91.
See John M. Connor, Price-Fixing Overcharges: Revised 3rd Edition 1 (Am. Antitrust Inst.,
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2400780 (finding after
exhaustive study that “[h]istorical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to
be too low”); Leslie, supra note 80, at 1040.
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In short, at least based on the Court’s stated rationale, Illinois Brick would
have come out the other way in today’s world—a world in which antitrust
arbitration agreements with direct purchasers are increasingly common and class
actions by direct purchasers correspondingly more difficult.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST LAW
In the 1970s, antitrust scholars worried that there was too much antitrust
enforcement.92 Illinois Brick and the antitrust injury doctrine were judicial
responses to that worry. While other decisions limited the substantive reach of
antitrust law, those cases limited the circumstances under which private parties
could enforce that substantive law.
The world has changed. In a series of cases over the past three decades, the
Supreme Court has dramatically reduced the substantive reach of antitrust law. 93
Government enforcement has also declined.94 And Italian Colors is likely to make
private enforcement infeasible for the single best class of private plaintiffs: direct
purchasers.
In the wake of Italian Colors, the more reasonable worry is that antitrust
violations will go unremedied because the best plaintiff is likely to be foreclosed
from enforcing the law by a standard-form contract. And if direct purchasers are
unavailable as plaintiffs, indirect purchasers will often be a better substitute than
competitors. Italian Colors and Illinois Brick together operate to preclude even
indisputably valid antitrust claims; the latter eliminates indirect purchasers as
plaintiffs, while the former hampers the ability of direct purchasers to sue. In short,
leaving politics aside, had the Court that wrote Illinois Brick confronted the facts
of antitrust as it now exists, it would have come to a very different conclusion
about the suitability of indirect purchasers as plaintiffs.
The solution is correspondingly simple: Illinois Brick should be overruled. It
is based on a set of judgments about antitrust law that are obsolete. If the Supreme
Court is unwilling to overrule Illinois Brick, Congress and the remaining state

92.
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984).
93.
See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87
TEX. L. REV. 685, 700–01 (2009).
Judge Easterbrook could speak in 1984 of the asymmetry between false positives and
false negatives, but the antitrust law he was talking about simply doesn’t exist anymore.
Courts in the last three decades have dismantled every per se rule applied to vertical
conduct, limited the per se rule in horizontal conspiracies in a variety of ways, made it
harder for plaintiffs to infer conspiracies, all but eliminated predatory-pricing claims, and
substantially restricted the role of monopolization cases. Win rates for antitrust plaintiffs
in at least one industry hover below 15%, and court rules make it harder and harder for
antitrust plaintiffs to show standing to sue to enforce the laws that remain.
Id. (footnotes omitted). We have no doubt that antitrust at one time was skewed toward overenforcement, but today if there is any bias it is in the opposite direction.
94.
Id. at 702 n.78 (“[T]he Antitrust Division has filed pro-defendant briefs in all of the major
antitrust cases before the Supreme Court in the past five years.”). While that was true in 2009, the
change in administration brought with it a somewhat more aggressive approach.
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legislatures should repeal the doctrine, allowing suits by indirect purchasers.
Alternatively, the Court could limit the reach of Illinois Brick to circumstances in
which direct purchasers either have already filed suit or, at the very least, are
permitted to do so. Repealing Illinois Brick only in the subset of cases in which the
defendants actually compelled arbitration would most fully avoid the double
compensation problem the Court identified. It would also help discourage the
widespread use of antitrust arbitration agreements. 95
We acknowledge that shifting antitrust enforcement to indirect purchasers is a
second-best solution96 because tracing the effect of the overcharge to indirect
purchasers is harder than simply measuring the price charged to direct
purchasers.97 Still, Italian Colors may have broader implications for antitrust
standing. If the best plaintiffs are no longer available, we might permit standing
not only by indirect purchasers, but also by competitors under circumstances in
which we currently do not.
We think the Italian Colors decision was probably a mistake and the best
solution would be to overrule it. But since it is unlikely the Supreme Court will
reverse a decision it made only one year ago,98 we proceed on the assumption that
Italian Colors will remain the law. And if it does, repealing or limiting Illinois
Brick will go a long way toward mitigating the harm it caused.

95.
For other ways to limit the effects of Italian Colors, see Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R.
Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration and Merger Approval, __ NW. U. L. REV. __, draft at 38–43 (forthcoming
2015).
96.
See Christopher R. Leslie, Achieving Efficiency Through Collusion: A Market Failure
Defense to Horizontal Price-Fixing, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 243, 267–69 (1993) (discussing the theory of the
second best).
97.
Furthermore, a class action brought by indirect purchasers will necessarily have significantly
more class members than a class action brought by direct purchasers, which can increase the agency
costs associated with class action litigation.
98.
It is possible that Congress will reverse Italian Colors, but it seems unlikely. Congress has
traditionally been very pro-arbitration, and indeed the Federal Arbitration Act has been interpreted as a
deliberate effort by Congress to strengthen arbitration over judicial opposition. Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013). Efforts to pass the proposed Arbitration Fairness
Act, which would limit the ability of companies to impose mandatory arbitration clauses on consumers
and expressly overrule Italian Colors, have so far failed. See generally Martin H. Malin, The
Arbitration Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should Not Be an All or Nothing Proposition, 87 IND. L.J.
289 (2012) (advocating for reform at least as extensive as the AFA).
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